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Colorblind Redistricting:
Racial Proxies as a Solution to the
Court's Voting Rights Act Quandary
by MICHELLE E. O'CONNOR-RATCLIFF*
"All other rights are preserved by the right to vote." '
I. Introduction
Emerson Moser, who was Crayola's senior crayon maker, having
molded over 1.4 billion crayons in his 37-year career, revealed upon
his retirement that he was blue-green colorblind.' Bulls are
colorblind and will charge at a matador's waving cape no matter what
color it is.' All people are colorblind at birth.4 Even the Constitution
is colorblind.' So, is colorblindness a good thing or a bad thing? Not
so good for a crayon-maker, but what about for our Constitution, our
courts, our laws, and our elected officials? Color still matters. This
basic tenet is reflected in many of our laws and in the actions of our
elected officials. The missing link is the Court, hiding behind errant
stare decisis and hopeful alternatives.
One law that recognizes the importance of race (or "color") is
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (hereinafter "Act"). As a 37-year-old
law that has gone through many amendments, the Act has elicited a
significant amount of commentary. There is also a plethora of judicial
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002. A.B., Stanford
University, 1997. I would like to thank all the editors and 2L members of the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly who worked so hard to get this Note ready for publication,
especially Sarah Zimmerman. Loving thanks to my husband for helping to clarify my
panic as I grasped at this topic.
1. Reverend Jesse Jackson, Address at UC Hastings College of the Law (Feb. 20,
2001).
2. http://www.comedy-zone.net/ezine/junOl/290601.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
3. http://www.myjokemail.com/120501.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
4. http://www.galaxyofhealth.com/bodyfacts.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
5. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan., J. dissenting).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
opinions interpreting the Act, resulting in some truly gobbley-goop
precedents.6 Much scholarly writing on the subject has sought to
create a blueprint for local governments to follow to avoid litigation,
attempting to find a way to incorporate all of the Court's holdings
into one easy-to-follow paint-by-number.7  This Note does not
attempt to fit a state's options into these narrow, conflicting,
confusing confines. Instead, it criticizes the Court's lack of coherent
direction for the states, points out the serious strain that strict scrutiny
places on the Voting Rights Act, and suggests ways that the Court can
provide better guidance, including an exploration of the viability of
racial proxies8 as a way to circumvent the Court's insistent colorblind
mess.
What mess? Where? In the wake of renewed commitment to a
colorblind ideal,9 an inherent tension in the 1965 Voting Rights Act
has become apparent: it looks and smells unconstitutional, but the
Court does not wish to say as much. In order to wash this unpalatable
taste from its mouth, the Court has issued a series of opinions meant
to zero in on a solution.1° The opinions seem to indicate the Court's
wish to accomplish the goals of the Voting Rights Act-namely,
redistricting to give racial minorities an equal voice in the political
process-without actually having to apply the strict scrutiny necessary
for all race-based legislation." The Court's answer? A benign race
proxy.
However, the Court has been overly slow, repetitive, and
contradictory in its recent applicable cases. Though a majority of the
Justices appear ready to make the changes necessary to ensure the
Act's productive future, they have so far only hinted about how they
wish to frame this issue in the future. The Court may have "stare-
decisis-ed" itself into a corner. If the Court does what it needs to do
6. See infra text accompanying notes 49-72.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 48-71.
8. "Proxy" is defined by Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary on the Internet
(http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary) as "authority or power to act for another."
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary online
(http://humanities.uchicago.edu/forms unrest/webster.form.html) defines "proxy" as
"[t]he person who is substituted or deputed to act or vote for another." Therefore, a
"racial proxy," as continuously used in this Note, means anything that can be substituted
for race as a classification that will act in the same way that race would act.
9. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996), Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
10. Id.
11. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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to make the Act a viable tool for creating more racial equality in
voting power, it may have to backtrack on decades of precedent,
forsaking principles of stare decisis with respect to its holding that all
race-based classifications, benign, invidious, or neutral, need to be
subjected to strict scrutiny." Strict scrutiny is the death knell of a
voting rights racial districting case-despite what the Court has
previously said. 3 If the Court chooses not to reject its precedents,
proxies for race may get the Court out of the corner into which it has
painted itself. Although better than total rejection of race as a
consideration in redistricting, proxies do not enable the Court to
recognize that colorblindness is not desirable in the context of voting
rights. Proxies are not good enough.
This Note will first provide a limited background of the Voting
Rights Act, then an evolution of strict scrutiny as applied to Voting
Rights Act cases. The discussion section will attempt to show that the
Voting Rights Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause as currently interpreted, and that the Court has
been purposefully avoiding this issue, aware of the potential problem.
Second, I will explore the reasons for the Court's avoidance of the
Act's unconstitutionality and how the Court's feelings about its own
strict scrutiny precedents seem to be changing. Third, this Note will
address the way in which the Court hopes to avoid changing strict
scrutiny rules by encouraging the adoption of benign racial proxies.
Finally, I will conclude with a review of the Court's options for the
future. Despite a strong move in the right direction with its recent
Hunt v. Cromartie14 ruling, the Court still has not resolved all the
issues that it created over the past six years. With major elections
occurring every two years, the Court will have ample opportunity to
address them at length-hopefully doing more than circumventing
the colorblind ideal with racial proxies.
II. Background
A. The Voting Rights Act
"[T]he Voting Rights Act of 1965 had the dramatic effect of
breaking down the barriers that prevented African Americans from
12. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
13. See id. at 237. I say that strict scrutiny is a "death knell" for redistricting cases
based on the outcomes of most racial redistricting cases. The states always seem to lose,
despite encouraging words from the Court to try, try again.
14. Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) [hereinafter Cromartie II].
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voting in the deep South... [and] was spectacularly successful in
accomplishing this goal." 5  The most important provisions that
accomplished this result were the ban on literacy tests, the
appointment of federal registrars where necessary, and the
"preclearance" requirement in Section 5 of the Act.16 Two sections of
the Act apply directly to this discussion: Section 2 and Section 5.17
Through them, the Court extended the utility of the Act to situations
in which "blacks were able to vote, but by chance or design the
system of representation had the effect of minimizing the influence of
their votes." 8
Section 5 of the Act applies only to "covered" states and
counties. To be "covered" by Section 5, the state or county must first
have had a test (usually a literacy test) affecting the right to vote in
1964. Second, the state or county must either have had less than 50%
of the voting age population registered to vote in 1964 or less than
50% turnout in the 1964 presidential election among the voting age
population.19 In 1970, Congress amended the Act, referencing 1968
dates in the above formula.' Currently, nine states are covered in
their entirety and seven more states have at least one county
covered.1  If a covered county or state wishes to make any change
affecting voting, Section 5 forces the county to clear the change with
the Department of Justice (hereinafter "DOJ") before it can be
implemented.22 Annexing territory, expanding districts, eliminating
an elected office, changing district boundaries, and expanding the size
of an elective body are all examples of things that need to be
approved by the DOJ under Section 5.'
15. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 143
(1995). See also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 21 (1992) ("In Mississippi, that stronghold
within a stronghold, black voter registration increased from 6.7 percent before the act to
59.8 in 1967. The act simply overwhelmed the major bulwarks of the disfranchising
system. In the seven states originally covered, black registration increased from 29.3
percent in March 1965 to 56.6 percent in 1971-72; the gap between black and white
registration rates narrowed from 44.1 percentage points to 11.2.").
16. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 143.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1999).
18. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 143.
19. 42 U.S.C.§ 1973(b) (1999).
20. http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_ -5/types.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
21. 28 C.F.R. §51.4 (2002), "Appendix to Part 51-Jurisdictions Covered Under
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, as Amended," (7-1-92 Edition), 824-26.
22. 42 U.S.C. §1973(c) (1999).
23. 28 C.F.R. §51.13 (2002).
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Getting approval from the DOJ is referred to as getting
"preclearance" and requires a showing that the voting procedure in
question "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 4
The test established for getting preclearance is neutral or better
treatment of minorities.25 Retrogressive changes (i.e. changes that
worsen the minority position) should never receive preclearance.26
Preclearance forces the jurisdiction that adopted the change to justify
it without even requiring a plaintiff group to challenge it, a benefit to
many minority plaintiff groups who may lack the resources to go to
court.2
The other relevant part of the Act is Section 2, which "provides
opportunity to challenge longstanding procedures or procedures
adopted in uncovered jurisdictions. It also provides an opportunity
for plaintiffs to object to a preclearance that has been granted [under
Section 5]." Although this Section originally focused on prerequisite
tests to voting (usually English literacy tests), one of the most
common uses today is in contesting a redistricting proposal,29 the use
at issue in this Note. Section 2 prohibits electoral devices, like
redistricting, that deprive minorities of equal opportunity to elect
other minorities." This situation can be described in the following
hypothetical: An Alabama city districting plan creates a new twenty-
eight-sided representation of its city limits from what used to be a
square. This new boundary just happens to -exclude almost all black
voters from the city limits. Black plaintiffs bring a suit claiming "an
intent to fence black voters out of exercising political power."'" What
can the Court do? On what basis may a state or municipality re-draw
those district lines? How much of a role can race play? We know
that the city has done something wrong because it used race as the
criteria for drawing discriminatory boundaries. No colorblindness
there. But should it be wrong for a less racist city plan to take color
24. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976).
25. Id. at 141.
26. Id. at 141 n.12.
27. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 184-85.
28. Id.
29. See Margarite Leone, Esq., Lecture for Election Law class at UC Hastings
College of the Law (Nov. 30,2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1999).
31. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 606 (1993) (describing the
scenario of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
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into account when re-drawing the lines to include all the city's
residents? Racial considerations can be very detrimental in some
circumstances and overwhelmingly important in others. The Court
should recognize that colorblindness is not always the answer.
B. The Evolution of Strict Scrutiny for Benign Racial Classifications
The Court struggles on with the question of what role race can
play in reaching the goal of a colorblind America. The purpose of
this section is to outline the beginnings of the Court's application of
strict scrutiny to beneficial racial classifications in order to provide a
background for the subsequent attack of this policy and to explain
why and how some members of the Court may be attempting to
escape that decision.
Race-specific classifications that benefit minorities, referred to as
benign or beneficial classifications, were not subjected to strict
scrutiny until 1995 in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.32 In arriving
at the present doctrine on this topic, the Court managed to go
through several iterations in the level of scrutiny the Justices felt
should be applied where the racial classification benefited minorities.
In 1978, the Court attempted to converge on a level of intermediate
review in University of California v. Bakke.3 In that case, UC Davis
Medical School adopted an affirmative action program which set
aside 16 of 100 seats in the class for members of minority groups.34
The Court, in a plurality opinion, struck the program down by a 5-4
vote,35 but failed to agree on the level of review necessary for their
finding. The four Justices who voted to uphold the program agreed
that it should be subject to "intermediate" review.36 Four others
wanted it struck down on federal statutory grounds (Title VI) and
therefore, never stated a standard of review.37 The final tie-breaking
Justice (Powell) struck it down by applying strict scrutiny.38
The Court's next attempt at developing an appropriate level of
scrutiny for racially benign classification came in 1980 with Fullilove
v. Klutznick.39 There, the Court upheld a Congressional affirmative
32. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
33. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
34. Id. at 275.
35. Id. at 271.
36. Id. at 362.
37. Id. at 421.
38. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
39. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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action program requiring 10% of public works project funds to be
given to minority business enterprises. The Court never explicitly
stated the standard of review that it applied in reaching its decision,
but said that the situation called for "close examination. ' Nine years
later in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,41 the Court finally
agreed on a strict scrutiny standard of review when it struck down a
city program that set aside 30% of funds for city projects for minority
business enterprises. 2 The case stood for the rule that strict scrutiny
must be applied for beneficial race-specific classifications enacted by
a state government body in order to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race, since even benign categorizations carry a danger of stigmatic
harm.43
The next year, in 1990, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission," the Court upheld an FCC preference
policy for minority station owners based on a desire to enhance the
diversity of programming available on the networks, applying only
intermediate review to this federal program.45 The Court sought to
distinguish the level of scrutiny necessary for benign racial
classifications based on whether the program was of state or federal
origin.
But five years later, the Court changed its mind in Adarand v
Pena.46 The majority felt that an interest in "consistency" required
that whenever the government treats a person unequally because of
his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls within the
language and spirit of the Equal Protection Clause.47 Therefore, the
rule from that case, which continues to stand today, is that all racial
classifications, whether the purpose is to benefit or burden, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local government, must be analyzed
under strict scrutiny.48
40. Id. at 472.
41. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 493.
44. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
45. Id. at 566.
46. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
47. Id. at 224.
48. Id. at 227.
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C. The Voting Rights Act Cases
The Court's jurisprudence of the Voting Rights Act, and in
particular, the Court's chosen level of scrutiny in evaluating state
compliance with its principles in the redistricting situation, is directly
related to the Court's evolution of thought on strict scrutiny. In this
section, I hope to lay that foundation.
The Court's first seminal case regarding districting plans was
Gomillion v. Lightfoot in 1960, in which the Court invalidated a
districting plan because the lines were drawn with a racially
discriminatory purpose.49 Four years later, in Reynolds v. Sims the
Court created its now famous "one person, one vote" doctrine,"
which caused a massive redistricting drive to meet the new standard. 1
The following year, the Voting Rights Act was passed by Congress.
Eight years later in 1973, Georgia v. United States52 held that the
adoption of legislative districting plans was subject to preclearance
under Section 5 of the Act. Hence began the Court's painfully slow
process of interpreting the Act.
Beginning with Beer v. United States53 in 1976, the Court began to
develop the non-retrogression principle of Section 5. New
ameliorative apportionments "cannot violate § 5 unless the new
apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as
to violate the Constitution," 4 referring, of course, to the Equal
Protection Clause.
The following year in United Jewish Organization v. Carey55 the
Court attempted to outline the way in which states should proceed in
complying with the Act, deciding that a state could, by
employing sound districting principles such as compactness and
population equality,.., attempt to prevent racial minorities
49. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. The phrase "one person, one vote" was not coined in the case, but the meaning
behind the phrase that was to come later was explored. "Legislators represent people, not
trees or acres." The Court went on to explain that the weight of people's votes should not
be diluted because their particular district contains 100 people while the neighboring
district contains only 50. Where a 100-person district and a 50-person district both have
the same right to elect one representative, the effect is to give twice as much weight to the
votes coming from the 50-person district. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
52. 411 U.S. 525 (1973).
53. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
54. Id. at 141.
55. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will
afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups
who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns
afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be
in the majority."
In 1986, a full nine years later, in Thornburg v. Gingles,57 the
Court finally developed the three-pronged test for establishing a
Section 2 violation. This test required minority plaintiffs bringing an
action against the state (or subdivision thereof) to show that (i) the
minority group is large enough to constitute a majority in a single-
member district; (ii) the minority group is "politically cohesive"; and
(iii) the white majority usually votes as a bloc for candidates different
from those supported by minority voters. 8 In an interesting case that
same year, Davis v. Bandemer, the Court applied a test of
intermediate scrutiny to political gerrymandering, the drawing of
district lines based on political affiliation. 9
Finally, we come to the modern cases where the Court
recognized, for the first time, a constitutionally-based cause of action
for voting rights violations, established a standard of strict scrutiny for
review of benign race classifications in redistricting, and attacked the
DOJ's interpretation of its role in ensuring Section 5 compliance-all
this in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision.6°  Hays v. Louisiana
expounded upon Shaw I the next year, holding that "any plan that
entails more racial gerrymandering than is absolutely necessary to
pass Voting Rights Act muster is potentially unconstitutional.
61
Miller v. Johnson62 was the next major decision of the Court. It
held that where race is the predominant, overriding factor in
56. Id.
57. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
58. Id. at 56.
59. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). "Gerrymander" is defined by Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary on the Internet, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary, as "to divide (an area)
into political units to give special advantages to one group." Webster's Revised
Unabridged Dictionary Online,
http://humanities.uchicago.edu/forms-unrest/webster.form.html, defines "gerrymander" as
"[t]o divide (a State) into districts for the choice of representatives, in an unnatural and
unfair way, with a view to give a political party an advantage over its opponent."
Webster's Unabridged is a description of a political gerrymander at the state level, while
Merriam-Webster's definition is broader and applicable to all types of gerrymander,
including both political and racial gerrymanders, at all levels of districting.
60. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I].
61. 839 F.Supp. 1188, 1197 n.21 (W.D.La. 1993), prob. juris. noted, 115 S.Ct. 687
(1994).
62. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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redistricting, proven by showing that the state relied on race in
substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting
practices, it must satisfy strict scrutiny.63 In Bush v. Vera the Court
held that "strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting
is performed with consciousness of race. '  "[F]or strict scrutiny to
apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting
principles were 'subordinated' to race.,
65
Shaw v. Hunt,66 or Shaw II, addressed three potentially
compelling state interests and found that "creating an additional
majority-black district was not required under a correct reading of §
5 ' ,67 and that the new district was not a narrowly tailored remedy for
the state's professed interest in avoiding Section 2 liability since it was
so oddly shaped.68  This has meant that as long as there is no
retrogression, any creation of an additional minority district must
conform to "normal" size and shape to be narrowly tailored enough
for the compelling interest of remedying past discrimination.
Hunt v. Cromartie is a follow-up case weighing in on this issue
of redistricting and race. It overturned the lower court's summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that a bizarrely shaped district is
not constitutionally vulnerable if political, rather than racial, ends
motivated the legislature.7" This was a fairly stark change for the
Court. The case was remanded to the lower court and made its way
back to the U.S. Supreme Court in Cromartie 11,71 the Court's most
recent holding. There, a generally dissenting Justice Breyer wrote for
the majority that the North Carolina legislature's motive in the
creation of Congressional District 12 was not predominantly racial,
but rather political since "race in this case correlates closely with
political behavior., 72 He also took the opportunity to reiterate and
add to the high proof threshold that a plaintiff faces and the high
deference a court must show to legislative prerogative. This case is a
huge move in the right direction for the Court and shows the
63. Id. at 916.
64. 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) [hereinafter Vera].
65. Id.
66. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
67. Id. at 911.
68. Id. at 907.
69. 526 U.S. 541 (1999) [hereinafter Cromartie fl.
70. Id. at 551.
71. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
72. Id. at 257.
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increasing influence of the previously dissenting Justices on the
majority.
Il. Discussion
The future of the Voting Rights Act looks somewhat bleak in the
face of the Court's strict scrutiny holdings. Its initial purpose of
ensuring that racial minorities are not denied the right to vote has
been fulfilled,73 so perhaps the Act should be allowed to lapse in 2007
when it is set to expire. But if the evolving purpose of the Act, to give
minorities an equal opportunity to elect minority candidates of their
choice and to ensure diversity in our legislative arenas, is important to
the Court and to our country, the Court must find a way to make it
work. This section will continue the discussion of the Court's strict
scrutiny jurisprudence in the context of the modern voting rights
cases. First, it will explore how the Act might be seen as
unconstitutional if the Court doesn't watch its step. Next, it will
examine the Court's uncertainty about its strict scrutiny precedence.
Third, this section will delve into the possible saving grace of the
Act-benign racial proxies.
A. The Voting Rights Act is Probably Unconstitutional Considering the
Court's Current Strict Scrutiny Jurisprudence.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
our United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part, "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."74 In applying
this amendment, Adarand imposes strict scrutiny even on racial
classifications that benefit minorities and are enacted by Congress.75
The Voting Rights Act was enacted by Congress. Additionally, the
Act attempts to protect (benefit) racial minorities in the redistricting
process by forcing states to keep racial considerations in mind when
drawing new lines. So why hasn't the Act been subjected to strict
scrutiny? It fits the profile, after all. Section 5 benefits minorities by
preventing retrogressive voting changes that have the effect or
purpose of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color. 7 6 This Section is based entirely on minority classification,
73. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 15.
74. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
75. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
76. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976).
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so it clearly warrants strict scrutiny by the Court. Section 2 is
similarly based on minority classification, prohibiting any redistricting
that deprives minorities of an equal opportunity to elect other
minorities. So does the Act survive strict scrutiny?
Under strict scrutiny, the Voting Rights Act's constitutionality is
questionable at best. Strict scrutiny requires that the Act be narrowly
tailored to fit a compelling interest.7 The Court has left no doubt that
remedying past discrimination qualifies as a compelling interest, but
has been quite reluctant to address other potential compelling state
interests having to do with Section 5 and Section 2 compliance.
Hence, the narrowly tailored prong has also become problematic.
1. Section 5 Fails the Narrowly-Tailored Prong By Being Overinclusive.
In Section 5, the Act attempts to achieve narrow tailoring by
being applicable solely to "covered" states and counties. Although
this is a good start toward staying away from over- or under-inclusion,
it has many problems. The criteria for identifying "covered" counties
tend to make the Section over-inclusive79 because they have led to the
inclusion of many areas of the country not traditionally thought of as
discriminatory.' Relatively progressive counties that happened to
have a large prison population ineligible to vote or a large military
population that voted absentee in another county were subsumed by
the Section 5 criteria. Whether this over-inclusion is serious enough
to warrant a finding of unconstitutionality is questionable; but if you
live in one of the four covered counties in California,82 the answer
may seem all too abundantly clear. Take for instance, Monterey
County. Monterey became a "covered" county when it was found to
have a test affecting the right to vote in 1968 (although it was a
statewide literacy test and not a local ordinance) and less than 50%
77. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986).
78. The compelling state interest I have in mind is an interest in increasing minority
representation in legislative arenas. This would entail recognizing the merits of the DOJ's
interpretation of Section 5's requirements and allowing the DOJ to require better than
non-retrogressive redistricting where possible.
79. Recall the criteria: The state or county must have had (i) a test affecting the right
to vote in 1964 (or 1968); (ii) less than 50% of the voting age population registered to vote
in 1964 (or 1968); and (iii) less than 50% turnout in the 1964 (or 1968) presidential
election.
80. See Leone, supra note 29.
81. Id.
82. Kings County, Merced County, Monterey County, and Yuba County. 36 C.F.R. §
5809 (1971).
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participation of its voting age population in the November 1968
Presidential election.83 Its population in 1990 aged 18 and over
(voting age) was made up of 17.6% non-citizens. 8 It also included
Fort Ord and other armed forces locations including the Naval
Language Institute, accounting for 8.5% of 18 and over residents, and
Soledad State Prison with 2.6%. These numbers show that 28.6% of
Monterey County's voting age population may have been highly
transitory, likely to vote absentee, or ineligible to vote due to
incarceration or lack of citizenship. Coupled with the fact that the
literacy test was a statewide law and not a specially enacted local
ordinance designed to discriminate against language minorities,
Monterey County appears to provide ample evidence that Section 5 is
overinclusive.
2. Section 5 Fails the Narrowly- Tailored Prong By Being Overbroad.
Section 5 lacks narrow tailoring in its broad policy of DOJ
discretion in granting preclearance. The DOJ had been under the
impression that its legislatively granted discretion in the redistricting
context allowed it to demand, not merely non-retrogression, but in
some cases an actual increase in the ability of minorities to elect
minority representatives (i.e. more minority dominated districts). But
the Court soon slapped the DOJ's hand for its presumptuousness.
Shaw I held that a "reapportionment plan would not be narrowly
tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond
what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. 8 5 In Miller v.
Johnson, the Court interpreted the DOJ's position as amounting to
an insistence on maximizing black voting strength through the use of
race-based districting, a position going beyond the scope of the Act,
bringing it "into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment."86  A
proactive reinterpretation of the statute allowed the Court to find,
"There is no indication Congress intended such a far-reaching
application of [the Act], so we reject the Justice Department's
interpretation of the statute and avoid the constitutional problems
83. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 271 (1999).
84. All demographic information found at http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org (last
visited Feb. 5, 2002). Unfortunately, complete information was not available for 1968
when the county's coverage was determined, but 1990's statistics should serve as a relevant
example nonetheless.
85. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654 (1993).
86. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995).
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that interpretation raises." 87 Vera reiterated that the problem with the
state's interest in complying with Section 5 is that it seeks to justify
not maintenance, but substantial augmentation of the black
population percentage in the district 8  Shaw H also found that
"creating an additional majority-black district was not required under
a correct reading of § 5."89
Those "constitutional problems" that the Court fretted over in
Miller should not be so easily judicially-interpreted away. The lack of
clear Congressional intent is part of what makes this Section
overbroad. Congress delegated too much legislative power to the
DOJ in Section 5, failing to narrowly tailor its law. But more
important is the flippant rejection of a possible Congressional intent
to increase minority representation beyond non-retrogression. It
seems impetuous of the Court to find over and over again that the
DOJ's interpretation of the scope of the Act was wrong, but ignore
that there was also no indication that Congress did not intend such
far-reaching application. This is judicial interpretation gone amok in
order to avoid finding the Act unconstitutional. The logical
conclusion from the Court's holdings and omissions is that Congress
defined too broadly the DOJ's power (so that the law is not narrowly
tailored) and defined too opaquely its own legislative intent (so that
there is no clear compelling objective).
The Court has purposefully avoided the issue of the
constitutionality of the Act by refusing to adequately address
Congressional intent as to compelling state interest-compliance with
Section 2 or with Section 5 or possible proactive increase in minority
representation-and has ignored the lack of narrow tailoring. The
Court stretches and stretches and interprets and re-interprets, trying
mightily to bring the Voting Rights Act within the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate. But close inspection reveals the Act's
constitutional strict scrutiny failure and the Court's blissful blind eye.
B. The Court No Longer Seems Certain of the Across-the-Board
Application of Its Strict Scrutiny Precedence.
The Court seems to be having some difficulty maintaining its
hard-nose line of strict scrutiny when it comes to some forms of
beneficial race-based classifications-namely those classifications
involved in voting rights. Although the Court has followed the
87. Id.
88. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996).
89. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 911 (1996).
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legislature's lead in steering clear of any proportional representation-
esque schemes, the Justices do not seem willing to completely let go
of the dream of a racially colorblind society where black and white
citizens will not be separated by their dearth or plethora of political
representation. Despite some of its overly-rosy holdings, the Court
does seem to recognize, along with the academic community, that the
utopia of a colorblind society has not yet come. "Even assuming the
validity of long-term aspirations toward a constitutional norm of color
blindness, the fact remains that this society can no longer tolerate an
absence of minority representation in its elite institutions, be they
professional academies or legislative halls."'  Given the Court's
comprehension of the situation, the Court should also discern that
race-based preferences are still a viable way to achieve equality in
political representation. So what can the Court do and what has it
done?
The Court's current version of strict scrutiny jurisprudence for
voting rights makes it very easy for the plaintiff91 to meet its burden,
but very difficult for the state to meet its burden. Not only has the
Court narrowed the number and scope of acceptable compelling
interests (possibly in contravention of actual Congressional intent), it
has made it extremely difficult to accomplish that goal in a narrowly
tailored way. Despite these precedents, the Court seems to have
recently become somewhat uncomfortable with its across-the-board
application of strict scrutiny for all racial classifications.'
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." (citations omitted). The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it."
The Court's seminal decision instituting strict scrutiny for all
beneficial race-based classifications bears out the Court's intent.
90. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 31, at 650.
91. In this case, the plaintiff to whom I refer is usually a non-minority group,
challenging a new minority controlled voting district.
92. Compare this "somewhat uncomfortable" feeling that I attribute to the Court
regarding its Adarand holding with the Court's "blissful blind eye," regarding the
unconstitutionality of Section 5 of the Act (supra page 74). While the Court is in denial
about the possible constitutional infirmities of the Act, the uncomfortable feeling I now
address is based in part on a simultaneous recognition that it can no longer remain in
denial.
93. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995), quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980).
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Only six years ago, the Court fully intended that strict scrutiny would
be applied in such a way that beneficial racial classifications could
persist in order to accomplish compelling state objectives such as
enhanced diversity 94  and eliminating discriminatory effects."
Nonetheless, the Court seems to have felt itself slowly slipping into
the morass of "fatal in fact" review of beneficial race-based
classifications and doesn't like where it's going.
The Bakke case is relevant to this discussion because of tie-
breaking Justice Powell's discussion of strict scrutiny in his concurring
opinion." Although not the opinion of the Court, and prior to a
definitive decision about the application of strict scrutiny, it does
supply some insight into the beginnings of the Court's thinking on the
subject of strict scrutiny. Justice Powell found two possible
compelling state interests that might be upheld if the educational
affirmative action program was narrowly tailored. First, the state
might wish to remedy past discrimination, but Justice Powell faulted
California for making no specific findings of past discrimination.97 If
it had, it seems that Justice Powell would have been satisfied of the
compelling interest. Second, the state might have an understandable
and proper interest in diversity, but Justice Powell criticized the
means chosen by the university as too rigid to be narrowly tailored.9Y
But Justice Powell did identify a program that he felt would pass his
strict scrutiny testy0 He praised Harvard's affirmative action plan that
treated race as only one factor in admissions, a "plus" for the
applicant."' Harvard's plan did not insulate a specific number of seats
for minorities as did UC Davis' plan.'' For Justice Powell, meeting
the narrowly tailored test was not that difficult. Seventeen years
later, the Court said it wanted to make sure that it would still be
possible to survive a strict scrutiny review. 2 What happened to the
Court's conviction?
Somewhere in between 1978 and the Adarand case, the Court
94. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
95. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
97. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 307-310.
98. Id. at 311-315.
99. Id. at 316.
100. Id. at 316-317.
101. Id. at 317.
102. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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turned a little sour on "benign" race-based classifications. In Croson,
the Court struck down a city program that set aside 30% of funds for
city projects for minority business enterprises. 3 There the Court
applied strict scrutiny and faulted the City Counsel for not identifying
the specific discrimination that it sought to remedy in such a way as to
show a compelling state interest."° Perhaps the Court was moved to
finally adopt a strict scrutiny framework because of the extraordinary
circumstances of the case, which may have allowed members of the
Court to imagine some level of reverse discrimination by a City
Counsel dominated by African-Americans."' There was, after all, a
spotty discrimination finding," a statistical comparison that did not
address the correct situation, 7 and no target minority-group. '0 8 It
looked like a situation rife with systemic abuse and reverse
discrimination, almost a natural scenario (if ever there could be one)
for the Court to feel that strict scrutiny was necessary to "smoke out"
illegitimate uses of race.' 9 This situation of a not-carefully-crafted
city ordinance led the Court down the dark path of strict scrutiny
destruction.
Justices Marshall and Blackmun make convincing arguments in
their dissents about the Court's mistake in insisting on strict scrutiny
for beneficial race-based categories. Marshall points out that
numerical and political supremacy is one factor to consider when
determining the level of scrutiny to apply, but minorities cannot be
suspect because they have achieved these things."' Other indicia are
103. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989).
104. Id. at 505, 510.
105. "Five of the nine seats on the City Council are held by blacks." Id. at 495.
106. The Court quotes a member of the City Council as saying, "There is some
information, however, that I want to make sure that we put in the record. I have been
practicing law in this community since 1961, and I am familiar with the practices in the
construction industry in this area, in the State, and around the nation. And I can say
without equivocation, that the general conduct of the construction industry in this area,
and the State, and around the nation, is one in which race discrimination and exclusion on
the basis of race is widespread." Id. at 480.
107. The statistics looked at the gross disparity between the black population in the
city (50%) and the percentage of construction contracts awarded to minority businesses
(0.67%). The Court suggested that the City Council should have looked at the percentage
of black contractors in the city and compared that to the percentage of contracts awarded
to those minority businesses instead. Id. at 499, 501-03.
108. The city used general anti-discriminatory language, including groups that had
never experienced discrimination in the city- Aleuts, Eskimos, etc. Croson, 488 U.S. at
506.
109. Id. at 493.
110. Id. at 553 (Marshall, dissenting).
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better: disabilities, history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegation to a position of political powerlessness."' Blackmun
continues in the same vein:
So the Court today regresses. I am confident, however, that,
given time, it one day again will do its best to fulfill the great
promises of the Constitution's Preamble and of the guarantees
embodied in the Bill of Rights - a fulfillment that would make
this Nation very special." 2
Might some of the Court have come around to these ideas?
The following year (1990), Metro Broadcasting brought a re-
evaluation of the members' positions on strict scrutiny and benign
racial classifications; the Court changed its mind when the federal
government's program was on trial, applying only intermediate
review."3  But five years later the Court was to regress again.
Adarand put an end to the question of when strict scrutiny would
apply to benign racial classifications. And the answer, unfortunately,
was always."4 It didn't matter that a federal program was at issue this
time. What suddenly mattered to the Justices was "consistency." '115
The majority felt that "consistency" meant that whenever the
government treats a person unequally because of his race, that person
has suffered an injury that falls within the language and spirit of the
Equal Protection Clause."6 How that strong language made it into a
majority opinion of this previously wavering and divided Court is
inexplicable. But the concurring opinions of Thomas and Scalia make
it clear that strong opinions weighed into the discussion. Justice
Thomas apparently equated this federal program with charity
handouts, asserting that "racial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous as discrimination," and "benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice.""' 7 Justice Scalia added that the "government can never
have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in
111. Id.
112. Id. at 562 (Blackmun, dissenting).
113. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547
(1990). Does the idea underlying the Metro decision offend the Court's recently proffered
notion of color-blindness? Can the federal government be allowed to make the
assumption that diversity in color of station owners will lead to diversity of programming?
Isn't that racist according to the Court's Croson concepts? So what if it is? Aren't we just
glad that the Court has abandoned strict scrutiny for the moment?
114. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
115. Id. at 229-30.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 241 (Thomas, concurring).
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order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination," because "under our
Constitution, there can be no such thing as a creditor or debtor
race.""
8
But again, three Justices dissented. Justice Stevens criticized the
Court's inability to differentiate between invidious and benign
discrimination and questioned the majority's inconsistency when
reviewing other types of discrimination-namely that gender
discrimination is only given intermediate scrutiny."9 Justice Stevens
pointed out the anomalous result inherent in the new standard
adopted by the Court: that it is now easier to enact affirmative action
programs to remedy gender discrimination than racial
discrimination.12 Justice Ginsberg would also have held that a
beneficial program should be reviewed under a less strict standard.'
Perhaps these Justices have made a dent in the other six Justices'
resolves in favor of strict scrutiny?
C. The Court Seems To be Encouraging the Adoption of Benign Racial
Proxies as a Way To Avoid Stare Decisis Problems.
The Court has thus far successfully avoided applying strict
scrutiny to a decision on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. I submit that the Court's disinclination to address the issue
stems in part from an inkling of how badly the Act would fare under
its current strict scrutiny jurisprudence (discussed in the previous
section). The other part of the Court's reluctance is based on the
knowledge that the Act's purpose remains important and popular,
"an acknowledgment that the interests of systemic legitimacy demand
that important public institutions be integrated in late twentieth
century America." '122 Perhaps for these reasons, the Court has begun
to encourage a move away from the Act and its overt racial
classifications, toward a system of benign racial proxies.
The Court's current moves were enabled in 1986 in Davis v.
Bandemer23 when the Court subjected a plaintiff's challenge of
political gerrymandering to a test of mere intermediate scrutiny. This
decision laid the foundation for a later substitution or proxy for the
disfavored racial classifications: political party affiliation-a proxy
118. Id. at 239 (Scalia, concurring).
119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 271 (Ginsberg, dissenting).
122. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 31, at 650.
123. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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that avoids a painful strict scrutiny death. But it did not stop the
Court's ever more antagonistic stance toward race classifications.
In 1993, Shaw I held that the Equal Protection Clause may be
violated where redistricting is so extremely irregular on its face that it
can only be viewed as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting."' This means that the redistricting forsakes traditional
districting principles without sufficiently compelling justification.
A plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the
Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the
legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters
into different districts on the basis of race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification.'
The Court quotes its 1943 Hirabayashi holding that "classifications of
citizens solely on the basis of race.., are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality." '126 In other words, avoid relying heavily on race distinctions,
even though that seems to be what the Act commands. Too
dominant a role for race can be fatal in the redistricting context if
other relevant concerns are subordinated.'27 The Court is hereby
laying its foundation for suggesting that line-drawers find some good
racial proxies to supplement or hide racial considerations, or else!
Race-based districting is required up to the point mandated by the
Act, but sharply restricted beyond the federal mandate.
1 8
The very next year, in case anyone missed it, Hays expounded
upon Shaw, holding that "any [redistricting] plan that entails more
racial gerrymandering than is absolutely necessary to pass Voting
Rights Act muster is potentially unconstitutional."'29 The Court's use
of the word "potentially" should have served as a flashing red light to
redistricting states (as potential defendants) that in order to get away
with an increased number of majority-minority districts (a better than
non-retrogressive redistricting scheme), racial considerations must
take a back seat to other considerations that would match up well
with race. This seems to be a very odd, back-door use of race. Isn't
124. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654 (1993).
125. Id.
126. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), quoted in Shaw 1, 509 U.S.
at 643.
127. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 236-37.
128. See id. at 238.
129. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.Supp. 1188,1196 n.21 (W.D.La. 1993), prob. juris. noted,
115 S.Ct. 687 (1994).
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there "something inherently unsettling about a constitutional
principle that allows race to be a key factor in drawing minority-
dominated districts so long as the result does not advertise the
ingredients of the process"?13
Just in case some states out there were still a little bit confused
about the Court's underlying message, the Court handed down Miller
v. Johnson.T Miller held that where race is the predominant,
overriding factor in redistricting, proven by showing that the state
relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional
districting practices, it must satisfy strict scrutiny. Aside from telling
states that still insisted on using race to create new district lines that
the districts had to "look good" (that is be compact, contiguous, and
respectful of city and county lines), '32 the Court again reiterated in a
not-too-overt way that states can avoid the fatal outcome inherent in
strict scrutiny by relying on factors other than race. To further push
the latter point, the Court identified three potential compelling state
interests that all failed to pass muster under the narrowly tailored
prong of strict scrutiny. The Court really seemed to go out of its way
to let states know that it had only been kidding when it said that strict
scrutiny was not an automatic death knell.13  "Avoid it all costs!"
seems the more accurate message after Miller. As the opinion of
Justice Kennedy points out, "the essence of the equal protection
claim.., is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters
into districts."" So to avoid an equal protection claim, a state should
stay away from racial considerations. Notably, the Court did
recognize that "[t]he distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to
130. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 31, at 618.
131. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
132. The academic community has repeatedly and consistently criticized the Court's
reliance on oddly shaped districts to invalidate Section 2 compelling interest defenses,
pointing out that "geography will [only] subdue - or hide - the evils of race-conscious
districting while serving the goal of political legitimacy." Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra
note 31, at 651. The ridiculousness of the Court's insistence on square voting districts is
especially highlighted when you consider that "even the foundation blocks of the Union,
the states, reveal odd configurations which would violate the 'traditional' districting
patterns. The odd shapes of Maryland and West Virginia, and the peculiar inclusion of the
Upper Peninsula in Michigan are notable examples." Id. at 616. Nonetheless, the Court
has stuck to a scheme where, as long as there is no retrogression, any creation of an
additional minority district must conform to size, shape, and other "traditional" districting
factors in order to be narrowly tailored.
133. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
134. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911.
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make."'35 So how do you make the distinction successfully? The
Court is unhelpfully silent on this question, leaving states to flounder.
The plaintiff's burden is also an interesting facet of this issue:
The plaintiff is to show, either through circumstantial evidence
of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence
going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district.
The Court makes it sound like a difficult threshold, as it should be to
cause strict scrutiny of the state's choices and the reasons for them;
but the tough-sounding bully is really a sheep at heart, allowing the
non-minority plaintiff to soar over this high hurdle with ease.
In fact, the dissent charges that a federal case can now be
mounted whenever the plaintiff plausibly alleges that other factors
carried less weight than race; that genuine attention to traditional
districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations, which
seemed under Shaw to provide a safe harbor, no longer offer any
protection.'37 It is through this methodology that the Court hints to
states that race is not a safe consideration for them. The Justices
seem to give states yet another glimpse into their hope that race will
cease to be a factor that the states force the Court to address. A futile
hope for colorblindness?
Vera only serves to reiterate the Miller decision and the inherent
paradox within that case by holding that "[s]trict scrutiny does not
apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
race."'38 Here the Court tries to maintain some respect for a state's
redistricting decisions (although seemingly only in word, not deed),
making it sound like a state can still use a race criteria when fixing
district lines. Despite those strong words, the Court found the
influence that incumbency protection had on the plan inadequate to
overcome the overwhelming use of race considerations. Although the
actual outcome of the case seems to go against the idea that using
racial proxies can be successful, the fact that incumbency protection
loomed over the Court's discussion shows that a political proxy was
making headway in chambers. Justice Stevens' dissent characterizes
this decision as a free ticket for states to draw bizarre districts for
white voters, but only compact, relatively square districts for minority
135. Id. at 916.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 949 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
138. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996).
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voters' 39-another negative outcome indissolubly linked to strict
scrutiny of beneficial racial classifications. Shaw H held, one more
time, that creating a majority-black district not required by Section
5's non-retrogression principle would only be allowed if the new
district was shaped more or less like a square.
The dissent from Shaw H offers interesting fodder for this Note's
discussion of racial proxies. Justice Stevens construes the majority
opinion to mean that "although States may avoid strict scrutiny by
complying with traditional districting principles, they may not do so
by proffering pretextual, race-neutral explanations for their maps."''
But he vehemently disagrees with the notion that race-neutral
explanations are necessarily pretextual. In fact, he criticizes the
majority, saying, "It is ironic that despite the clear indications that
party politics explain the district's odd shape, the Court affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering
claim."'42 Justice Stevens' logic must have struck a chord with the
majority of the Court, resulting in the very recent Cromartie H
decision, which endorses his view of partisan gerrymandering.
Cromartie I was the transition case that enabled the Justices to
dip their toes in to test the water before throwing themselves into
Cromartie I. Cromartie I held that a bizarrely shaped district is not
constitutionally vulnerable if the legislature was motivated by
political, rather than racial, ends.'43 An affidavit by an expert witness
who found strong correlation between racial composition and party
preference was used to show that in precincts with high black
representation, there is a correspondingly high tendency for voters to
favor the Democratic Party. The Court accepted this evidence as
enough to overcome summary judgment for the plaintiffs.'"
Evidence that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one
congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in
a neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove thatjurisdiction was motivated by race in drawing its district lines
when the evidence also shows a high correlation between race
'41
and party preference.Is the Court stepping back from its prior habit of letting stand without
139. Id. at 1035-36 (Stevens, dissenting).
140. 517 U.S. 899, 911 (1996).
141. Id. at 932 (Stevens, dissenting).
142. Id. at 938 n.14 (Stevens, dissenting).
143. 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
144. Id. at 549-50.
145. Id. at 551-52.
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question any lower court finding that the plaintiff's strict scrutiny
burden had been met? The Court answers, "Our prior decisions have
made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats
happen to be black democrats and even if the State were conscious of
that fact." '46 Have they really? Not on the surface. This statement
only lends additional credence to the theory that while the Court says
one thing, what it is really saying is quite another. Was the Court
actually saying that political party affiliation can serve as an
acceptable proxy for race, even when the district lines are less than
box-like? What about those prior cases where the Court seems quite
happy to just let the plaintiff's burden slide and address the state's
district lines under strict scrutiny anyway? This is the corner into
which the Court has painted itself-an unwillingness to go back and
violate stare decisis, coupled with Unhappiness with the current
application of its precedents. Could the Stevens dissent in Shaw II be
the way out?
The much anticipated Cromartie II opinion by Justice Breyer was
heralded in the New York Times as "one of the most important since
he joined the court., 147 In finally putting an end to the Shaw and
Cromartie North Carolina District 12 problems, the Court resolutely
proclaimed its support for correlating race with political behavior in
order to avoid strict scrutiny.
[T]he Constitution does not place an affirmative obligation
upon the legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out to
be heavily, even majority, minority. It simply imposes an
obligation not to create such districts for predominantly racial,
as opposed to political or traditional, districting motivations. 48
In answer to Justice Stevens' Shaw II concerns, Justice Breyer
declared that Cromartie II does not hold that "a legislature may
defend its districting decisions based on a 'stereotype' about African-
American voting behavior." 49 In fact, evidence of voter registration
was specifically found to be inadequate. However, actual voting
behavior was dispositive, showing in this case that black Democrats
voted more reliably for the Democratic candidate than did white
Democrats, who more often crossed over to vote for the Republican
146. Jd. at 551.
147. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Permit Race As a Factor in Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES,
April 19, 2001, at Al.
148. Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001).
149. Id. at 257.
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candidate."' Hence, the Court found that including the most reliable
Democrats is consistent with a political, rather than a racial, motive.
Additionally, the Court re-iterated and sought to clarify
somewhat the plaintiff's burden and the deference to legislative
decisions courts must show:
[G]iven the fact that the party attacking the legislature's
decision bears the burden of proving that racial considerations
are "dominant and controlling," [citation omitted], given the
"demanding" nature of that burden of proof, [citation omitted],
and given the sensitivity, the "extraordinary caution," that
district courts must show to avoid treading upon legislative
prerogatives, [citation omitted], the attacking party has not
successfully shown that race, rather than politics, predominantly
accounts for the result.'
In fact, the Court went on to extend that "demanding" burden of
proof for the plaintiff, requiring the following:
[W]here majority-minority districts (or the approximate
equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking
the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least:
1) that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate
political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably
consistent with traditional districting principles and
2) that those districting alternatives would have brought about
significantly greater racial balance.
1 52
So there it is. Cromartie H presents, on a silver platter, the way
to better-than-non-retrogressive redistricting. It leads the previously
wayward state, trying to give minorities a chance to elect candidates
of their choice, a way out of strict scrutiny. If the data from North
Carolina is generally applicable across the country, states and their
subdivisions may now feel safe in couching redistricting with a race-
based "look" in "most reliable Democrats" terms. The Court may
have found its Way out-for now. Political party voting behavior
serves as a convenient benign racial proxy to enable avoidance of
stare decisis problems. Score one for the Court!
150. Id. at 255.
151. Id. at 257.
152. Id. at 258.
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IV. Conclusion
Is this racial proxy good enough? Is it a workable, useful
precedent for states that will last? Certainly it allows the Court to
maintain the ridiculous moral high ground of colorblindness. But that
as yet unattained ideal simply should not be treated as if it were
reality. The Court should drop the pretext of stare decisis and
recognize that it has made a mistake in establishing strict scrutiny of
beneficial racial classifications, especially in the voting rights context.
We are not yet a colorblind society and are likely a long way from it.
Despite Justice O'Connor's assurances to the contrary, 3 strict
scrutiny does mean death to any and all racial classifications-even
the beneficial ones.
The Court's recently endorsed approach to districting is to more
freely recognize the potential for racial proxies like political party
affiliation that can avoid strict scrutiny. 4 Although this may get the
Court out from under its heavy strict scrutiny millstone, it does not
adequately disentangle the Court from the Equal Protection paradox
of the Voting Rights Act. Does it really make sense to allow party
affiliation to act as a proxy for race in order to escape strict scrutiny
for an oddly shaped new legislative district? What about income
level? Common urban interests? It comes down to this: Do proxies
solve the problem, or only make the contradictions within the
spectrum of redistricting decisions more pronounced? I choose the
latter.
Abandoning race as a viable consideration for beneficial
programs is not the Court's best option. Race awareness does have a
part to play in building America into the Court's dream utopia that
eventually becomes colorblind. Although I applaud the Court's
extension of the idea of political party as a racial proxy in Cromartie
H, it will never suffice in the long run. Although the proxy clarifies
some confusion of prior decisions, it also prompts states to pretend
that race is not a factor-encouraging false colorblindness. No one is
fooled. The Court has only promoted a semantic differentiation to
justify the end result of majority-minority districting.
If the Court is unwilling to turn its back on stare decisis, it will be
left to model future decisions after its short-term solution in
Cromartie H: expect more and better proof from plaintiffs seeking to
153. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
154. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
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prove that race was the overriding factor in setting new district lines,
and strengthen the level of deference to legislative districting
decisions courts must show. The Court had previously established a
difficult-sounding burden for the plaintiffs, so it did not have to
change much, although the augmentation to the burden is laudable.
All that was necessary in Cromartie II was a crack-down on lower
courts allowing plaintiffs to reach their burdens with ease. More
deference might allow a softening of expectations on the state in
showing a compelling interest with a narrowly tailored solution.
With the 2000 census complete, redistricting based on growing
and shifting state populations is in full swing. There has already been
a flurry of lawsuits filed against these new district plans, and there will
undoubtedly be even more, seeking to invalidate those elections.
Whether the anticipated gerrymandering claims will be centered on
race or political party could be up to the Court.
In the future, the Court might choose the bold move of
reinterpreting Congress' legislative intent embodied in the Act,
expanding the compelling interest to one in "diversity"5 or an
increase in minority representation, not merely prevention of its
demise. This is a bolder, longer-term solution than found in
Cromartie H, and would eliminate some discussion of the Act's
unconstitutional Equal Protection stickiness. It would also be a true
move toward a more colorblind society, allowing states to increase
minority representation out in the open, instead of hiding under the
guise of a proxy that may become less legitimate over time and space.
Colorblindness is a laudable goal, but it is just that-a goal; and
unattained as yet. Colorblind laws and colorblind courts cannot be
successful until people are truly colorblind. The Court should
recognize that one way to guide people to colorblindness is to create
opportunities for racial equality 'in voting and political
representation-let the Act do its job.
155. See University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256, 299 (1978).
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